Since the end of the Cold War, according to the US Department of State, approximately 100 armed conflicts have erupted worldwide, 35 of which stem from internal disputes based on identity. Collectively, such crises have come to be described generally as “ethnic conflict,” a term that refers to inter-group violence based on language, religion, race, ethnicity, sect, class, caste, clan or some combination of these. Such identity wars collectively may be referred to as internal conflict.
While weapons proliferation and terrorism remain serious potential security threats, internal conflict represents the most lethal and actual security threat of our time. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, more people—some estimates put the total as high as 5 million—have died from internal conflict than from international terrorism and interstate wars combined. Far greater casualties could result from a second generation of failed states, particularly in more populous societies.
Anticipating and assessing such conflict is highly complex. It requires extensive knowledge of the societies at risk, as well as the ruling elites, history, culture, demography and economy. Also critical is an understanding of the specific social groups in those societies and their political relationships to each other and to the state. These factors cannot be analyzed by quantitative techniques alone. Another complexity is the fluidity of group identity in such disputes. All individuals hold multiple social identities Each becomes relevant for different purposes in different situations. Shifting identities is not uncommon in conflict that target civilians.
The development of better diagnostic and analytical tools for early warning and policy assessment is needed, both to prevent military intervention, if possible, and to improve preparation, when necessary. Thus far, such methodologies remain elusive. Existing works tend to be too general, lack policy-relevance, verify the obvious or are of limited practical utility. Studies that rely exclusively on quantitative techniques fail to capture key variables that are not subject to statistical verification. They often oversimplify complex situations, lack the texture of “ground truth” in countries at risk, and do not provide an overall analytical framework. Some have argued that we already have adequate early warning from humanitarian workers, human rights organizations, diplomats and international organizations. However, these are actually late warnings that usually sound the alarm after the fire has broken out, when it is often too late to put out the blaze. Early warning should alert the international community before the combustion actively ignites, in sufficient time to respond to and prevent it, hopefully without military intervention.
Furthermore, while the international community has devoted significant attention to post-conflict strategies and the definition of missions for military intervention, it still lacks adequate tools to enable analysts to track a conflict over time—before, during and after violence—so that policy makers can provide continuity in an integrated response over the duration of the conflict and its resolution.
The present invention addresses some of these needs. It presents a methodology to better anticipate, analyze and assess a country at risk as it teeters between war and peace. It can be utilized by multinational organizations, such as NATO, international organizations, such as the UN or World Bank, individual state governments, intelligence analysts, scholars and researchers. The present invention should not be construed as a paradigm for all conflicts (such as revolutionary, ideological or territorial wars), although elements could be adapted and applied to conflicts involving states with homogenous populations. Neither should the present invention be seen as a prescription for specific policies, a formula for predicting international humanitarian responses, or a mechanism for addressing questions of political will or national interest. The present invention may strengthen the capacity of the international community to anticipate and respond more effectively to impending catastrophes. At the very least, leaders will not be able to say that they did not fully appreciate what was happening.